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Walter P. Krolikowski
Loyola University of Chicago

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Higher grades may not be synonymous with higher ranking.

The role of the school in reforming society structures

by Walter P. Krolikowski
Loyola University of Chicago

Educational innovations continue to be in the news. As long as the American public voices its dissatisfaction with the progress of its children and as long as the American schools remain a uniquely effective vehicle for getting ahead, school personnel will continue to experiment. We have recently received reports on two such experiments, and phenomenally extensive and expensive one at the Chicago Circle Campus of the University of Illinois and another on the progress of those students who beat out Allan Bakke for admission to the medical school at Davis, California. Both are worth pondering.

In October, 1977, Ira W. Langston and E.E. Oliver issued a summary report on special support programs at the Chicago Circle Campus. Since 1968, the University of Illinois has recruited and admitted over 5,000 minority students for special programs: the Educational Assistance Program, the Native American Program, the Latin American Recruitment and Educational Services program and the Confederation of Latin American Students. Special orientation programs, advising and tutorial services and special course were specifically designed for these students. In addition to the usual federal and state monies available to all needy students, approximately \$5 million has been spent since 1968. Surely, a large scale effort.

In November, 1977, Donald L. Reidhaar, general counsel for the University of California, reported on the present status of the 16 students who had been admitted in preference to Allan Bakke in the medical school of the University of California at Davis. The experiment here lay in admitting a special group of students, traditionally excluded from medical schools, rather than in devising special aids for them.¹

We shall discuss these reports at the end of this article. But it is important that we lay a groundwork that will help us come to grips with these and other examples of structural reforms that extend far beyond attempts to help this or that individual.

Efraim Shmueli has pointed out that liberal intellectuals may react in one of two ways to the need for reform; they look for a change in social institutions or in the individual:

Historically the liberal intellectuals fluctuate between two orientations. The one is directed toward perfection of man by eliminating the social, economic and political sources of evil. The intellectuals of this group are structure-oriented. The second orientation attempts to purify the human qualities of reasoning and behavior by moral exhortation or other educational techniques in the hope that the economic, social and political institutions will gradually become manifestations of universally accepted humane intentions.²

The second group of liberals, of course, would say that changing individual men is precisely the way to effect changes in society; many educators belong to this camp.

We will begin by analyzing certain features of the contention of the first group. There are several reasons for choosing this starting point. The profound changes and the increasing rate of social change push social scientists and educators to look for quicker and more efficient methods of bringing about, in a planned fashion, desirable social changes.

Changing society is not like changing individual men. Society is more than the men who are its members. Since society consists of patterns of interlocking and interacting structures, changing society entails changing the structures of society.³ Now this is no easy task. If psychologists despair of changing the individual, social scientists despair of changing society. Most of society's structures have survived centuries of effort to abuse them, on the one hand, and to reform them, on the other. The origins of most instruments of society are hidden in prehistory; their continuing presence is taken for granted, and they change with what Charles Sanders Peirce would call "secular slowness." For all their variations, primary institutions, like forms of the family, property ownership, subsistence economy and social mobility, have been extraordinarily impervious to change.⁴

Changing society through changing social structures, then, has been adopted not because such an approach is intrinsically easier than changing individuals. Indeed it seems equally, if not more, difficult. But it has the advantage of offering an alternative to personal reform, one which offers hope of greater effectiveness, simply because of the scale on which it would operate, at a time when time itself is at a premium.

Finally, this approach is congenial to some educators. Educators, beginning with Plato, have been

tempted to be hyphenated kings. Academic people are often tempted to think that one social structure in particular, the school, is precisely the best instrument to bring about these reforms, less risky and "dirty" than direct political action and more likely to make an impact than the writing of treatises.⁵

For these and other reasons, the idea of the structures of society deserves close analysis. If educators are serious, and I think they are, confusion of thought and purpose is to be avoided. "Full speed ahead!" is a legitimate cry only when goals have been clarified and agreed upon and means are clearly available and commensurate to the task.

II

For educators, the idea of the reform of the structures of society can function in three different ways: as one among many objectives of the educational enterprise; as a criterion for choosing one set of actions, possibly educational but possibly not, over another; or as a criterion for improving the educational enterprise.

Historically, schools have purported to have and have had different objectives or goals. Self-realization, life-adjustment, vocational preparedness, the cultivation of intelligence, citizenship education and the reform of society—separately and in tandem these objectives have influenced theorists and practitioners alike. If the last of them is taken seriously as an objective, two presuppositions are worth uncovering. It is assumed that the school is an apt instrument of reform, but it is not assumed that the school itself needs reform. In other words, such a reformer might say: "There is nothing wrong with schools; what is wrong with society will ultimately be corrected because the schools are preparing reformers of society."

When the idea of reform functions as a criterion for choosing one set of actions over another, different assumptions are operative. It is not assumed that the school is an apt instrument of reform,⁶ nor is it assumed that the school itself needs reform. Let me explain.

If we think of the structures of society as the institutions of agriculture, business, government, industry and intelligence; and if we ask ourselves how we can most effectively participate in the reform of society, we are asking which of these institutions is in need of reform and what actions on our part will bring about that reform. We may say that agriculture needs reform or business or several or all of them. Further, we may ask whether our action through one or more of these institutions is the best way to reform society. It may be that we will judge rather that personal action outside these structures will be the most apt instrument of reform. In all of these cases, we are asking, among other things, where we should stand in relation to these structures. Several alternatives are possible. Should we run for the Congress of the United States, accept a position with Inland Steel, work for IBM? Then we would be working toward reform within the structure itself. Should we seek a position on the staff of a national magazine, work for a lobbying group or a pressure group? Then we would be at some distance from the structure, and the reforms we advocate would have to come about through the mediation of an informed public or ingroup we had aroused. Or shall we operate within the framework of the school and attempt to form men and women who will be the agents of change? Then we are farther removed from the action of reform itself, but ultimately we might have greater success than if we were

participating in the daily skirmishes. From this perspective, the idea of reform reduces itself to the question: At what remove should we act? The answer may but does not necessarily involve the school.

Even if we decide that the schools offer the most effective point of departure, there are still two possible tasks open to us. We can say we do not know what the future will bring and, therefore, that we do not know how the structures of society should be reformed. If we prepare young men and women well through the instrumentality of a general education, they will know what to do when the time comes for adult action; and they will be eager to do it. Or, secondly, we can say that the structures of society need or will need this or that particular reform and we can prepare students explicitly to solve those particular problems.

Let me offer examples of these two approaches. Marx and Engels' program in "The Communist Manifesto" is an example of the first. After nine points that refer most properly to the industrialization of the nation and the collectivization of agriculture, Marx and Engels add a tenth: "Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of children's factory labour in its present form. Combination of education with industrial production, etc." Although the program does not lack all specification, it is still quite general and, in the main, formal.

An example of the second might be Lenin's plan, as described by Professor Pavel A. Kashutin, Rector of the Lenin Teachers' Training College in Moscow:

Therefore, along with industrialization of the nation and collectivization of agriculture, Lenin's plan for a socialist society advanced, as the third important task, the carrying through of a cultural revolution. Lenin pointed out that in the given case the matter concerned a radical turn in the spiritual life of the masses: shaping up an attitude towards property as belonging to the people and towards work as not being forced, but of being free and creative for the benefit simultaneously of one's self and society; remoulding of the world outlook of the people, and instilling to a greater degree in their minds the psychology of collectivism, friendship and mutual assistance, and, finally, involving broad sections of the working people in running the state.⁸

Lenin's program spells out objectives with a degree of specificity beyond that of Marx and Engels. It is at least conceivable that similar objectives could be stated for the reform of the structures of American society and that students' education could be planned in function of these objectives.

Thus would run the second of three possible interpretations of the reform of the structures of society; reform would serve as a criterion for action, a criterion for selecting one instrumentality over others. But the concept of reform may also function as a criterion of self-improvement. Here too, assumptions are operative. It is assumed that the school needs reform, but there need be no assumption that other structures in society require reform nor that the school is an apt instrument for the reform of those structures. Here the reformer is inward-looking.

From the perspective of the school as an ongoing structure of society in need of reform, we have already answered the question of our distance from the structure. We are within one of the structures, and we assume it is

an important structure either in itself or in relation to other structures. We are not asking about the school in relation to the reform of society, at least not directly. The question, "How can we improve school?" can be subsumed under the larger question, "How can we improve society?" but it need not be. Either question assumes that improvement is necessary. The *status quo* is to be abandoned. New procedures must be devised and implemented. Some experimentation is, therefore, called for.

Abandoning the tried and true but inadequate is the very hallmark of reform, and it is simultaneously a justification for experimentation. Since the concept of experimentation is as loose as the concept of reform, the possibility of compounding confusion is quite real. For this reason, a brief analysis of the way the idea of experimentation functions in this context is necessary.

III

I would suggest that there are at least three different meanings of experimentation. First, an experiment can be instituted to demonstrate on a small scale; and therefore as economically and prudently as possible, an improvement, which would then become the norm for practice generally. The whole intent of such an experiment is to replace what is presently being done. Inherent in such an experiment is a note of threat to the established way of proceeding.

Let me offer an example. The Chicago Public High School for Metropolitan Studies, like Philadelphia's Parkway School, is such an experiment. Opening in February, 1970, with about 150 students and presently enrolling about 350 students, Metro attempts to give a representative group of Chicago high school students an educational experience which exploits the students' interests and abilities and the learning opportunities available in the Chicago area. It attempts to furnish a new and flexible curriculum model; a new school architecture—a "school without walls"; a new administrative model—the democratically run school. It is at once a positive affirmation of the ways school ought to be operated and a polemic against the way schools are presently run.⁹

Other experimenters are intent on a different catch with their nets. Present procedures may not be doing an effective job for a certain population. Some young men and women, let us conjecture, are incapable of profiting from the present program for academic, psychological or financial reasons. An experiment could be launched, then, to help this group of students. For example, a group of sixth graders, who most probably would be unable to attend high school specializing in science programs, might be placed in an intensive pre-high school program. This kind of experiment might benefit students otherwise incapable of going down a track of science studies.¹⁰ And it does not threaten currently established programs in any way.

Still other experimenters may simply be looking for interesting alternatives to accepted procedures. For example, I play a solitaire game. Four cards are laid down, face up. If there are two cards showing of the same suit, the lower of the two is discarded. Then four more cards are laid down. Winning the game is exceptionally difficult, for the player must end up with the four aces alone. Recently, I have tried to lose rather than win, always, however, obeying the rules. I take the seemingly more unintelligent alternative when alternatives are available. I

have found that I do equally well, no matter how "intelligently" or "stupidly" I play the game. For chance factors are much more important than any other. Similarly, an experiment may show that an alternative is no better or no worse than the established procedure. What we may have thought of extreme importance turns out not to matter very much. In other words the null hypothesis is confirmed. The net result may be that we loosen up and relax. Alternatives may turn out to be equally good (and equally bad).¹¹

Carl Bereiter, in a paper presented at the December, 1970, meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, reported that he has been able to identify many unteachable areas of learning; by which he means that some things "are either not learned or are learned just as well with or without teaching."¹² It is his contention that productive thinking skills; concepts and principles, other than in science and mathematics; arithmetic reasoning or problem-solving; reading comprehension; appreciation of literature, art, music, as distinct from knowledge and preference; composition skills, such as organization, clarity, and style, as distinguished from the mechanics of writing; and citizenship or socialization to the prevailing norms—all are unteachable in his sense. In other words, young men and women will or will not learn these skills and attitudes no matter how much or how little the schools attempt to teach them. If his conclusions successfully resist criticism that will probably be proposed, they exemplify the third meaning I am proposing for the word **experimentation**: alternatives that make no difference. For whether the school teaches these materials or not, the student will have the same chance of acquiring them. Note too the implications of this meaning of experimentation for reform: some reforms have, similarly, no positive or negative impact. They neither speed up nor slow down whatever changes are occurring.

IV

Bereiter's work offers a convenient transitional bridge to the constructive part of the paper. Before attempting to show the relative worth for the teacher of the differing meanings of reform, I shall essay an explanation of the fact, for which Bereiter gives evidence, the "unteachability" of certain skills. Explaining why what teachers do may sometimes make little or no difference may prepare the ground for other and larger questions such as why "planned change" may on occasion be no more effective than unplanned change.

I would hypothesize that the self-activity of students is probably as important in the learning process as chance is in my game of solitaire. Let me explain why I think such may be the case.

Charles A. Curran has expounded a theory of teaching which turns the ordinary conception of the teacher-student relationship around.

The teacher in our viewpoint should be seen as a client . . . not as a counselor. It is the student who must act as a counselor and who should understand the teacher if learning is to take place. The teacher, like the client, is in deep need of being understood, and to be received and accepted by the student at the intellectual or emotional level of his struggle for creative communication. Reversely, the student is not, in this conception, in the client-patient role but rather in the counselor-therapist role. The teacher who is creative is suffering with ideas that are welled

up within him and that he needs to express and have understood. It is the student who can be in the therapeutic position of understanding and genuinely relating to the teacher as he unfolds, often with painful intensity, the ideas that he is invested in.¹³

The teacher comes to his students like a client coming to a counselor. He, the client, speaks, and the students, like counselors, listen carefully, try to understand, nod encouragement, reflect what he has been saying, ask questions and show their understanding of the teacher-client. If he has been understood, the session has been successful. He goes away happy.

This model of the teacher-student relationship is not unique to Curran. Although Israel Scheffler is by no means using Curran's metaphor of an inversion of the usual conception of the counselor-client relationship, he is conceptually quite close when he writes:

To teach, in the standard sense, is at some points at least to submit oneself to the understanding and independent judgment of the pupil, to his demand for reasons, to his sense of what constitutes an adequate explanation. To teach someone that such and such is the case is not merely to try to get him to believe it: deception, for example, is not a method or a mode of teaching. Teaching involves further that, if we try to get the student to believe that such and such is the case, we try also to get him to believe it for reasons that, within the limits of his capacity to grasp are our reasons. Teaching, in this way, requires us to reveal our reasons to the student and, by so doing, to submit them to his evaluation and criticism.¹⁴

If Curran's model and Scheffler's analysis are persuasive, certain questions arise. Why do students put up with a teacher? Why do they accept him as their client? They are not being paid, as the ordinary counselor is. I conjecture that they accept him because they "love" him. Plato's insight into the erotic relation of teacher and student seems to me to point to a necessary condition for a flourishing teaching-learning situation.¹⁵ Out of love students are willing to sit long hours listening to the teacher and trying to understand him.

But why do students love the teacher? Perhaps the students love their teacher because he is attractive and compatible. Beyond these personal and unpredictable reasons, I would guess that students love their teacher because the teacher represents, indeed is, the adult world, the world out there waiting to be explored, the great beckoning unknown, the offer of infinite riches. Curran, from his psychological point of view, conjectures that the teacher, by communicating himself in trust to others, is, in opposition to the death-wish, choosing and affirming life.¹⁶ Students are attracted to the life-chooser. There is an additional reason, too. The teacher offers some distance from the adult world. He is a critic who sees that "world he is" in relation to an ideal of what the world might become; of what he, the world-embodying teacher, might become; of what the students before him might become.¹⁷

The normal end-result of the student-teacher relationship is that students understand the teacher. They do not necessarily end up loving what the teacher loves, doing what the teacher does, even becoming the world that the teacher is. The basic reason this condition prevails is that students are independent, self-activating beings over whom the teacher has no ultimate or even intimate con-

trol. What students accept from the world or accept of the ideal depends on themselves. Possibly for this reason the teacher and his methods make little difference. How students come to understand the teacher depends on themselves, just as how the counselor understands his client depends on the counselor's ingenuity and patience. Just as the counselor does not imitate his client's mode of life, so students do not necessarily imitate the teacher's mode of life. It is true that parents often feel uncomfortable sending their children to teachers of a social class, and with political and religious beliefs, different from their own. But should they? The name of the teaching game, well played, is freedom.

As a consequence, if the teacher is intent on reforming the structures of society in a pre-determined way, it is likely that teaching is a relatively ineffective way to bring about reform. If, on the other hand, the teacher is intent on reforming the structures of society but without a pre-determined ultimate plan or objective,¹⁸ teaching may be a relatively effective method of reform.

V

This hypothetical explanation of the relation of student and teacher has, then, led us to choose the less rigidly structured approach to reform. What further implications can be drawn on the basis of this analysis? A review seems to be in order.

Proposing that one of the objectives of the school is the reform of the structures of society assumes that the school is an apt instrument of reform. If the self-activity of the student is as important as I have suggested, "apt instrument" needs specification. The school's effectiveness will be mediated through the autonomous, largely unpredictable (pace B.F. Skinner), and future activities of the students.

Second, the school as an instrument of reform is committed to working at a third remove from the structures themselves. The universities as a moral community have had a measure of effectiveness in influencing political and community decisions, but the elementary and secondary schools to my knowledge have had little influence. The teachers, through their national and local organizations and through union activity, have, in some small measure, been effective, but teachers are not the schools.

Third, it seems preferable, because more realistic, for the school to aim at general rather than specific preparation of its students. Not only the autonomy of the student calls for this approach; the rapidity of change in the social **Problematic** militates against specific preparations for specific problems. For the solutions to these problems, short-term instruction in para-educational institutes or workshops seems likely to be more effective.

Fourth, nothing that has been said would close out any of the three forms of experimentation. Each seems to have its own strengths and weaknesses.

VI

Let us now return to the two cases we began with. How successful have they been? Norman Cantor, a university vice chancellor for academic affairs and a noted medieval historian, summarized the findings of the report: "Groups of students with comparable ability made the same academic progress whether enrolled in special support or regular support programs at the University of

Illinois at Chicago Circle." In other words, the money was spent to practically no effect. Although the survey has been challenged by James Griggs, director of the minority group aid program and president-elect of Malcolm X College, the two statistical sociologists from Urbana insist on the validity of their findings.

Reporting on the Davis experiment, Donald L. Reidhaar used practically the same words as Norman Cantor but to quite different effect: "I don't think there is any significant difference in the rate of their (the 16 minority students) success and that of non-minority students." One of the 16 has been named by his classmates "most likely to succeed" and won the Senior Class Award. At Davis, the 16 who were not comparable to the other students admitted on the basis of the usual traditional criteria, were comparable on the basis of their performances in medical school.

The contrast is great. In the first case special efforts were taken, efforts that do not seem to have helped. In the second case no special efforts were made to offer extra help to those who were admitted because of their minority status, and no special help seems to have been needed. We are, as we frequently are in human affairs, in the presence of a paradox. Do something extra and it does not help; do nothing extra and it helps greatly.

The projects at the University of Illinois have brought about no great changes in society. It is not even clear that they were instituted to change anything except the university itself. But surely these projects were begun because educators at the University of Illinois saw a great need for internal reform. As experiments they were preceded by no pilot study on a small-scale. They were full-blown projects intended to help a group of students traditionally considered unsuitable for college work. But it has turned out thus far that the experiment is empirically seeking nothing more than an attractive alternative to more traditional techniques. Nothing revolutionary has eventuated. In this instance, the Berelther claim seems substantiated.

The new admissions policy at Davis has, however, far-reaching implications. Although not yet realized, great changes in the medical profession can be expected. A group of people traditionally barred from a profession, at least in such numbers, have doors of opportunity open to them. A reform in school policy may very well bring about substantial reforms in the professional sectors of society. The decision at Davis to open its doors to many more minority students on a quota-like basis led to an experiment that has paid off, an experiment whose implications have yet to be fully spelled out. One such implication may very well be that the traditional criterion of academic excellence is a needlessly exacting criterion. Students with lower achievement scores in academic subjects may be as successful in medical (and other professional?) school as those with higher scores. Higher grades may not be synonymous with higher ranking. If this conclusion stands against the criticism it inevitably invites, it will indeed create not only a reform but a revolution in that social structure called the American school.

Footnotes

1. For information on these two programs I have relied on the October, 1977, Summary Report of Research Memorandum No. 77-8, "A Study of Special Support Programs at the Chicago Circle Campus of the University of Illinois," by Ira W. Langston and E.E. Oliver; and on reports by Milt Freudenheim and by Fred Mann

which appeared in the *Chicago Daily News* for November 14 and 15, 1977.

2. Efraim Shmueli, "Modern Hippies and Ancient Cynics: A Comparison of Philosophical and Political Developments and Its Lessons," *Journal of World History*, 12 (1970), 491.
3. I will not attempt to justify this statement, which has become almost a commonplace. For a justification, see Neil J. Smelser, "Processes of Social Change," in Neil J. Smelser (Ed.), *Sociology: An Introduction* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), pp. 667-728. Nor do I find sociologists, generally using "structures" to refer to institutions with some lasting power, guilty of the same systematic ambiguities in their use of "structures" as educational theorists. Joseph S. Lukinsky, in his article, "'Structure' in Educational Theory," *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 2 (1970), 15-31, discerningly spells out the difficulties "structure" as a slogan is encountering in educational writings.
- Possibly one of the difficulties educational theorists and other social theorists are encountering with the word "structure" is that it implies the *status quo* and "changing the structures of society" therefore entails a contradiction. Erich Fromm's distinction between structure and order can be helpful perhaps in persuading theorists to disavow identifying structure with order. From Fromm, order allows only mechanical changes which in no way threaten the present style of life. Men living under law and order are threatened by the spontaneous and free aspects of life, but they are not threatened by purely mechanical changes which allow for adjustments that reduce conflict and make more secure the *status quo*. On the other hand, men who find the *status quo* under any terms intolerable usually react to this mechanical stance by over-reacting: freedom comes to involve anarchy and licentiousness, the "absence of tradition, absence of structure, absence of plan." Fromm would posit between the "death" of order and the anarchy of license that structure, analogous to the structure or system inherent in any biological organism, which precisely allows the organism to interact creatively with its environment. See Erich Fromm's article in *Summerhill: For and Against* (New York: Hart Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 262-263.
4. Cf. Carlton H. Bowyer, *Philosophical Perspectives for Education* (Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1970), p. 235. For the term "primary institution" which refers to institutions which are essentially durable in the midst of "secondary institutions" which change more rapidly, see Abram Kardiner and Ralph Linton, *The Individual and His Society* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1939), pp. 244-245, 326-327, 471-483.
5. A classic account of the relationship of education to the reform of society is William O. Stanley's *Education and Social Integration* (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1953).
6. For a recent statement on the school as a reinforcer of, rather than an agent of, social change, see Harold G. Shane, "Social Decision Prerequisite to Educational Change, 1975-1985," in *The Future as an Academic Discipline. Ciba Foundation Symposium 36 (New Series)* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1975), pp. 73-81.
7. Emile Burns (Ed.), *A Handbook of Marxism* (New York: International Publishers, 1935), p. 46.

8. Pavel A. Kashutin, "V.I. Lenin and National Education," *Convergence*, 3 (1970), 80.
9. Written material on Metro is hard to come by. The January 19, 1971, issue of the *Chicago Sun-Times* and the September 28, 1975, of *The Chicago Tribune* contain feature articles on Metro. The Chicago Board of Education issued in September, 1969 a report entitled "Chicago Public High School for Metropolitan Studies: Rationale and Program."
10. Some features of Metro are experimental in this sense as well as in the first meaning.
11. Mayer reports that in some learning situations there are "no significant differences in learning or posttest performance on retention or transfer" between groups who have learned materials in what would be considered a normally intelligent sequence and those who have had the same materials presented to them in a "scrambled" way. See Richard E. Mayer, "The Sequencing of Instruction and the Concept of Assimilation-to-Schema," *Instructional Science*, 6 (1977), 379.
12. Carl Bereiter, "What Is Teachable?" page 1 of a mimeographed abstract of the paper. For a more extended treatment, see his *Must We Educate?* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973).
13. Charles A. Curran, *Psychological Dynamics in Religious Living* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), pp. 116-117. For an earlier formulation, see Curran's *Counseling and Psychotherapy. The Pursuit of Values* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), pp. 289-290. In his *Religious Values in Counseling and Psychotherapy* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), pp. 211-227, Curran emphasizes a different relationship. He writes of the student who learns by finding, in the teacher's acceptance of himself as a total human being, a model for, and the resources for, accepting himself as a totality.
14. Israel Scheffler, *The Language of Education* (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1960), p. 57.
15. See H.I. Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity* (New York: New American Library, 1964), pp. 50-62.
16. Curran, *Psychological Dynamics in Religious Living*, p. 116.
17. It may be suggested that as a matter of fact children do not love their teachers. We hear much of the difficulties compulsory schooling involves. Against their wills, children are compelled to go to school. Teachers are the masters; children, the slaves. A love-relationship between master and slave is simply a sick relationship.
It may be of some interest to note Aristotle's position that master and slave, so long as they love the same things, can be friends:
The part and the whole, like the body and the soul, have an identical interest; and the slave is a part of the master, in the sense of being a living but separate part of his body. There is thus a community of interest, and a relation of friendship, between master and slave, when both of them naturally merit the position in which they stand. But the reverse is true (and there is a conflict of interest and enmity), when matters are otherwise and slavery rests merely on legal sanction and superior power.
Aristotle, *Politics*, 1255b (Ernest Barker translation).
18. Obviously, this formulation does not mean to deny the possibility of a predetermined plan methodologically, only substantively.